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Case No. 8233 
IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MARY RAMIREZ, 
Appellanti 
OGDEN CITYv a municipal 
corporation of the 
State of Utah, 
Respondento 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal is taken from a judgment of dismissal 
of appellant 0 s amended complaint with prejudice by the 
lower court (Tr. 038). The issues were determined by 
the trial court at a pre-trial conference~. Thereafter 
at the time of trial certain facts were stipulated to 
be true and contentions of the parties discussed and 
settled. Thereupon the cause was submitted to the 
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Court upon the pre-trial order (Tr. 030) and upon 
stipulated facts (Tr. 043) and upon the respondent's 
answers to appellant's interrogatories (Tr. 014). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Agreed facts, as stated in numbered paragraphs in 
the pre-trial order are as follows: 
1. That the Respondent is a municipal corpora-
tion of the State of Ut'ah. 
2. That Ogden City owns the land upon which is 
located the premises wherein the appellant was injured. 
3. That on the eighth day of March, 1952, at 
approximately nine o'clock p.m., the appellant 
attended a social function being held in the Community 
Center, which is the property owned by Og-den City men-
tioned in 2 above. 
4. That while in the ladies 5 powder room of the 
Community Center. Building, the appellant's dress 
brushed against an unprotected gas spa.ce heater and 
caught fire, inflicting injuries upon her person. 
5. That on at least three occasions ,prior to 
March 8, 1952w other groups had had access to the 
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Community Center Building and had paid to the director 
a sum of money for the use thereofo 
6. That the appellant is obligated to Doctor 
Grua, a medical doctor, in the sum of $500.00 for 
services rendered her in treating her for injuries 
which she received and about which she complains in 
this action and that said sum is a reasonable sum for 
the services rendered. 
7. That the appellant obligated herself to pay 
to the Dee Hospital the sum of $150.00 for blood 
transfusions furnished her in the necessary care and 
treatment of her as a result of injuries she received 
and about which she complains in this action. 
8. That pre~trial Exhibit 1 is a correct summary 
of the disbursements, salaries, operating expensesv 
repairs, maintenance, and revenues as shown by the 
books and records of the Director of Finance of Ogden 
City for the years 1948 to and including 1953. 
9. That on March 8, 1952, the Havana Club held 
a function in the Conununi ty Cen.ter Building and paid 
to the director thereof the sum of fifteen dollars, 
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and that said Havana Club charged those who partici-
pated in a dance which they were sponsoring seventy-
five cents per person. 
10. That ·pre-trial Exhibit 2 is a photograph of 
the gas heater against which appellant's clothing was 
ignited and of which she complains in this lawsuit. 
11. That Mrs. Buelah Jones was at the time of 
injuries complained of herein the director of the 
Community Center Building and was in the employ of the 
respondent and that her duties were to direct recrea-
tional activity at the Community Center Building. 
12. That from on and about September 1, 1946, to 
May 1, 1952, the Community Center Building was under 
the general management of a board of directors which 
had been elected at open mass meeting of the members 
of the public who had occasion to use said Community 
Center Building and that all activities in connection 
with that building were directed by that board; that 
prior to March 8, 1952, and at all times material to 
the matters involved in this lawsuit certain men 
served at the invitation of Commissioner Thomas East 
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as advisors to the board of directors elected as 
aforesaid. 
13. That from September 3, 1946, to November 1, 
1946, the snack bar and concession was rented by Ogden 
City to a third party and charged therefor rental at 
the rate of $101.00 per month; that thereafter the 
concession and snack bar was rented to another person 
at a rate of $50.00 per month and that the relation-
ship as above set forth was terminated prior to the 
year 1948. 
14. That appellant filed with the respondent 
timely a claim in the amount of $75 0 000.00 and that 
more than ninety days elapsed thereafter before the 
filing of this suit. 
15. That all funds received by the director of 
the Community Center Building were expended under the 
direction of the board of directors elected as set 
forth in 12 above. 
Further facts 0 not disputed 0 are as follows: 
The premises known as the Community Center came 
to Ogden City by deed on October 40 1939. (lnterroga-
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tory 1) • Between that date and November 20, 1944, 
barracks buildings were moved onto the premises and 
there readied for occupancy. On November 20, 1944, 
Ogden City entered into a lease with the United Ser-
vice Organization for the said premises for a period 
from date until cessation of hostilities with Germany 
plus six months, which period ended in the fall of 
1946 (lnt. II) o 
In August 1946, Tom East, a city commissioner of 
Ogden City 0 called a mass meeting of citizensv at 
which meeting a board of directors was created by a 
resolution of said citizens, and advisors to assi~t 
the board of directors were informally nominated by 
Mro East, said commissioner of parks, to serve on a 
voluntary basis (Into 12) o 
The commissioner of parks to Ogden City, Mr. East, 
in calling said meeting and in appointing said 
advisors, was "acting for himself alone without the 
concurrence of the Ogd.en City Conunissjon". (Int. 5). 
Said board fixed its own policy, was atonomous to 
itselfo It never received instructions nor directions 
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from Ogden City concerning the manner in which it 
operated said Center. 
The premises were returned to Ogden City in the 
fall of 1946. Said board, created as above set out 0 
had from September I, 1946, until after the accident 
herein complained of, ''-the direct and active manage-
men to supervision 0 operation and control of said 
Conununity Center". 
Both under the lease with the United Service 
Organization and its arrangement with said board of 
directors~ Ogden City annually contributed money for 
the maintenance and operation of said Community Center 
(Int. 7 and 15) • 
From the time thepremises were returned to Ogden 
City by the United Service Organization in the fall of 
1946 until after the time of the injury herei.n com-
plained of, Franklin Richards, the Director of Parks 
and Public Property for Ogden City 0 had charge of the 
maintenance of said Community Center (Int. 6). 
Beulah Jones became the director of said Cpmmu~ 
nity Center on or about September 9 1951, and con-
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tinued thereafter as such director until after the 
time of the injury herein complained of. She received 
her salary from Ogden City, but was under the direc-
tion and supervision of said board (Int. 6 & 7) • 
On March 8, 1952 7 and on at least four _other 
occasions the Havana Club, an organization of Spanish 
speaking people 0 rented a portion of said Community 
Center premises for the purpose of holding a dance. 
On March 8th, 19520 and said four other occasionsv 
said Havana Club paid to the director the sum of 
$15v00 for the use of said premises 0 for which an 
entry of "hall rental• was.made by the director in her 
report to the said Ogden City (Exhibit ~. 
The Havana Club charged those who participated in 
the dance the sum of seventy~five cents per personv 
which the appellant intended to pay upon entering the 
portion of the building where the dance was held. In 
said Community Center there is but one ladies' rest 
room, to which the appellant and her sister-in-law 
went directly upon entering said Community Center 
Building. 
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The Exhibits 2 and 3 are a picture and diagram of 
said premises. While standing before a mirror the 
appellant's dress brushed against the small defective 
gas stove, situated in part underneath the only mdrror 
in said rest room, and was ignited; and she suffered 
the injuries complained of. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
Ao That the trial court erred in dismissing 
appellant's amended complaint with 
prejudiceo 
B. That the judgment of dismissal was against 
the facts and the lawo 
Co That the relationship of landlord and 
tenant existed between the respondent 
and the Havana Club at the time of 
accident. 
D. That the respondent was engaged in a 
proprietary function. 
E. Even though the operation of Community 
Center was a governmental function in 
g.eneral, it was proprietary as to 
appellant at time and place and under 
circumstances of appellant's injury. 
ARGUMENT 
It is appellant's contention: 
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1. That a landlord-tenant relationship existed 
at the time of the injury between the respondent Ogden 
City Corporation and the Havana Club and that said 
Havana Club was either a lessee directly from Ogden 
City or a sub-lessee throngh the Board of Directors of 
the Community Center. That in either relationship 
Ogden City is responsible to the Appellant as a land-
lord under the authority of 
Lowe vs. Salt Lake City, 13 Utah 91, 
44 P. 1050. 
That case was an action for damages for personal 
injuries. The defendant rented a portion ·of t.he City 
Hall to the Legislature as a legislative chamber ·for 
holding its session in 1889, received rent for the use 
thereof. It was found that the Legislature was right-
fully there. The defendant was the owner and occupant 
of the premises at the time of the accident. The 
plaintiff was a member of the Legislature, and was 
rightfully on the premises, attending a night session. 
There was an outhouse in the rear of the premises. It 
was locked up with a key in some office in t,he build-
ing. Plaintiff went out in the dark, there being no 
10 
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light in the yard, got oft the pathway leading to the 
outhouse and fell into an open hat-chway and was 
injured. The jury returned a verdict for the plain-
tiffo Defendant conceded that the plaintiff had the 
right to go to the outhouse but said he was restricted 
to the pathway and when he turned off it he was a tres-
passer and could not recover. The court held 0 among 
other things, that the yard was appurtenant to the 
hall, and 0 in the absense of any restrictions, the 
members of the Legislature had a right to make a 
proper use thereof; and that plaintiff's use was not 
unlawfulo In part the Court said: 
tt'We think that the leaving of the hatch-
way in an unguarded and unprotected condition 
by the defendant 9 as shown by the evidence 0 
and the failure to have any light in the yard 
by which its condition could be seen 0 was 
such negligence as rendered it liable for 
any injury which was caused thereby." 
The Supreme Court of Idaho 0 in the case of 
Pineock VSo McCoyQ 281 Po 371 
distinguished that case from the Lowe case upon the 
ground that the plaintiff in the Idaho case was a 
police officer who was upon the premises in question 
11 
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as a mere licensee. In referring to the Lowe case, 
supra, the Idaho Court said: 
·~pecially commended to our attention by 
appellant is the case of-Lowe vs. Salt Lake 
City 13 U. 91, 44 P. 1050,-57 Am. -St;· Rep. 708, 
an examination of which disc-loses that it.was 
decided upon the principal of landlord and 
tenantv not applicable here; the court stating 
that the defendantv by invitation, induced 
the respondent to come upon the premises, 
knowing their dangerous condition and was 
therefore liable for the injury." (Under~ 
scoring oursol 
The rule laid down in the Lowe ease, supra, was 
referred to with approval in the· case of 
Lunt VSo Post Printing and Publishing Company 1 
110 Po 203 
in this language: 
"* * * It will. be nO-ticed that .. the rule 
itself-, as announced in the case of Bennett 
vs. Railroad Co., supras and in other cases 
cited by plaintiff (Atlanta Cottonseed Oil 
Mills vs. Coffee, 80 Ga. 145, 4 S.E. 759, 
12 Am. St. Rep. 244; Beck vs. Carter, 68 
N.Y. 283, 23 Am. Rep. 175; Lowe vs· .. Salt Lake 
City 13 U. 91 9 44 P. 1050 9 57 Am. St~Repo 
708;_ Learoyd; vs. Godfrey, 138 Mass.· -315; 
Beehler vs. :-1Danie.ls 18 R.I. 563, -29 Atl. 6v 
27 L.R.A. 512, 49 Am. St. Rep. 790; Hart vs. 
Cole, 156 Mass. 475, 31 N.E. 644 9 16 L.R.A. 
577) , bases t.he. qu_e.stion of rec.o.very 
primarily upon the fact that an invitation, 
express or implied, was given to the injured 
partyv by which invitation he was induced, 
or lead, or lured, or enticed by the defend-
12 
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ant upon the premises where the injury 
occurred." (Underscoring ours.) 
The Court distinguished the Lunt case from the Lowe 
case, supra, in that the plaintiff Lunt was a fireman 
who died from inhaling fumes in a building which was 
on fire, the Court holding that the plaintiff was a 
mere licensee. 
The Lowe case, supra, was cited with approval in 
the case of 
Harris vs. City of Bremerton 147 P. 638 
which was an action for personal injuries from falling 
into an open space between the two floats constituting 
a public municipal dock, in which the Supreme Court 
of Washington held that the City's negligence was for 
the jury, and this, notwithstanding the fact that the 
plalntiff paid no fee for landing his launch at the 
wharf. 
The rule in the Lowe case was also recognized in 
the case of 
Burbidge vs. Ut~h Light and Traction Co. 
211 P. 691 
In the recent decision of the Utah Supreme Court 
13 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ln the case of 
Davis vs. Provo City, 265 P. (2) 415 
the Court analyzed the relationship between Provo CitYo 
Brigham Young University and the plaintiff and referred 
to Section 356 of the Restatement of Torts in the 
following lang~age: 
"In the Restatement of Torts sec. 356, 
the general concept in such circumstances is 
sunnnarized:-· , 'Except as stated in secso 357~ 
362, a _lessor of land is not liable for 
bodily harm caused to his lessee or others 
upon the land with the consent of the lessee 
or a sublessee by any dangerous condition 
whether natural o:r artificial which existed 
when the lessee took possession.' Further, 
the lease may be created by words or other 
conduct expres·sing consent to the lessee w s 
possession5 Seco 355 (a) • The only 
applicable exception listed i.s at sec. 395: 
'A lessor who leases land for.a purpose 
which involves the admission of a,,Jarge 
number of persons as patrons of his lessee, 
is subject to liability for bodily.harm 
caused to them b an artificial condition 
exist!ng when the essee took possession, 
if the lessor <a> knew or should hav.e .. known 
of the condition and realized orshould have 
realized the unreasonable risk to them in~ 
volved therein, and (b) had reason.to·e?q?ect 
that the lessee would admit his p-atrons - -
before the land was ut in reasonably safe 
COn i tion .or their l'eee~tlOn e hlS -
doctrine is applicable irrespective of 
whether such person paLS lor his aamiSsion 
or is admitted free of cbargeo sece 359 
(c), and irrespective of whether the Jease 
14 
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is for rent or other valuable consideration 
or is a free gift, Secv 359 (d) • " (Under-
scoring ours J 
A like result was reached in 
Worden vs. New Bedford 131 Mass. 23, 
41 Am. Rep. 185. 
Furthermore, it is apparent from the circum-
stances of this case that there was a tenancy at will 
between Ogden City and the Board operating the Commu-
nity Center. As hereinafter statedw the United Service 
Organization leased the premises from Ogden City; and 
thereafter the Board which operated the Community 
Cemer continued the same type of operation without a 
formal leaseo But whether or not the City had pre-
viously leased to the United Service Organization a 
tenancy at will arose between the Board and the de~ 
fendant City. In 
51 C.J.S. Section 159, 766 
as to "mere permissive occupancy" the rule is stated: 
"A permissive occupation of real estate 0 
where no rent is reserved or paid and no time 
is agreed on to limit the occupation, is a 
tenancy at will." 
In the same volume, at page 762, section 156, it is 
15 
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stated: 
"The tenant at will is in possession by 
right with the consent of the landlord either 
express or implied. * * * His estate is a 
leasehold." 
(See note 15 where it is indicated that the 
words "lease''-, "lessor", and "lessee• include 
in appropriate instances tenancies at will 
and parties to such tenancies. 
CoiiDDonweal th- vs. Goldberg 64 N .E. (2) 438, 
319 Masso 7 0 and eases therein cited.) 
See Thompson on Real Property 0 Volume 3, 
page 14, Section 1022. 
2o That the respondent- Ogden Ci-ty was engaged in 
a proprietary function at the Community Center at the 
time and place in question for the following reasons: 
a. Ogden City has never assumed control over 
said premises from the time it came into existence. 
b. That the functions of said Community Center 
were under the direct control of the United Service 
Organization while leased to them and thereafter-under 
the control of the Board of Directors mentioned above. 
e. A leasing of sa-i-d premises to the United 
Service Organization was a proprietary function and 
the same lack of governmental control is evidenced in 
16 
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the arrangement with the Board. That Ogden City did 
not consider the operation of the Community Center as 
a governmental function is borne out by the fact that 
it did not assume responsibility for operating said 
Center and did not legally delegate such responsibil-
ity even if it could do so. Article I of the Ogden 
City Charter provides in part as follows: 
"All powers of the City shall be exercised 
as prescribed by this Charter 1 or if not herein 
prescribed~ then as prescribed by ordinance." 
We have made a search and have been unable to find any 
ordinance relating to the operation of the Community 
Center by the City. That such is the case is also 
borne out by the answers to the interrogatories on 
file herein. 
While it is true that a so-called Board of Direc-
tors was set up as previously outlined herein, this 
Board was not acting as an arm of the City or under 
any expressed power derived therefrom. The limit of 
the power to legally create such a Board is set out in 
37 Am. Jur., page 667, et seq. 
See also Delegation by Municipality, 37 Am. 
Jur. 0 page 732. 
17 
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As concisely put in 
McQuillan on Municipal Corporations 
Volume lv Section 382: 
"Therefore the principle is fundamental 
and of universal application. The public 
powers conferred upon a municipal corporation 
and its officers and agents cannot be 
surrendered or delegated to others." 
The City's contention th~ operation of the Center was 
a governmental function is at variance with the rule 
prohibiting the delegation of authority and the facts 
in this case. Ifv therefore, the City could not dele~ 
gate the power certainly Commissioner East could not 
have done so. 
3. Even if the operation of the so~called Commu= 
nity Center were held to be a governmental function in 
general 0 the function became and was proprietary as to 
the appellant at the time and place and under the cir~ 
cumstances of appellant's injury. 
That the City may be engaged in a governmental 
and proprietary activity at the same time and place is 
borne out by the following case: 
Rhodes vs. City of Palo Alto 223 P.(2) 639. 
In that case the Community Center was situated in a 
18 
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public park 0 included a theatre 0 soft ball park 0 play 
ground and other facilities. The parking lot was 
available to any of the persons using the facilities. 
The plaintiff drove to the parking lot to park her caro 
she walked toward the auditorium 0 stepped into a hole 
in the paveme-nt 0 causing her to fall 9 resulting in the 
injuries sued for. 
Defendant claimed (1) that the community theatre 
and parking lot were governmental functions because 
they benefitted the public welfare; (~ that the 
operation of the parking lot was a governmental 
function even if the operation of the community 
theatre was a proprietary one; (3) also that the 
community theatre was donated by a philanthropist who 
expressed the expectation that it would advance the 
interests of adults in recreation activities; and (4) 
that the theatre was administered by the City 
recreation department. The court in analyzing these 
conditions stated (page 642): 
"Trueo it was maintained for the benefit 
of the community in the sense that it afforded 
the populace a meeting place for many forms 
of amusement and instruction. But in all 
19 
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these respects it differed no whit from any 
other auditorium or assembly hall built and 
maintained by private capital for the same 
purposeso '". 
The verdict~for t.be plaintiff was affirmed. 
Two cases cited in the Rhodes case, suprav were: 
Chafor vs. City of Long Beach 163 P. 670 
Sanders vs. City of Long Beach 129 P.(2) 511. 
The Chafor case was decided prior to the enactment of 
the Pu,blic Liability Act of Californiaq but that act 
was not a factor in the decision reached in any one of 
the three cases cited above. 
A like holding is found in 
Engles vs. City of New York, 6 N.Y. Supp. 2nd, 
page 436 
where an action was brought against the municipality 
for injuries sustained by the plaintiff on alighting 
from an elevator to visit a pay patient in the hospitM. 
The verdict for the plaintiff was affirmed on appealv 
the Court pointing out that although the operation of 
Kings County Hospital was certainly a governmental 
function costing the City about three million dollars 
while receipts were slightly over one hundred thousand 
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dollars 9 the City, while furnishing hospitalization to 
plaintiff's sister, was engaged in an enterprise for 
gain and as a consequence thereof owed certain duties 
to the patient and her visitors. The jury found among 
other facts that plaintiff sustained her injury while 
visiting her sister who was paying for the service, 
that as to that patient the hospital was being con-
ducted for profit and that at the time of the accident 
so far as plaintiff was concerned the City was not 
rendering a public or governmental service but was 
exercising its proprietary or corporate powers and 
said at page 438: 
·~o one will contend that if a city con-
ducts an activity for profit, that it js per-
forming a governmental function. That the 
city enjoys both powers - proprietary or 
private and governmental or public. It may 
exercise those two powers under the same 
roof - at one institution." 
An analysis of the several Utah cases brought 
against the municipal corporations reveals that in all 
of the cases where the rulings were adverse to the 
plaintiffs, the city was engaged in its usual govern-
mental functions such as enforcing police regulations 0 
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preventing crime, preserving public health, preventing 
fires, etc. In the two cases in which rulings were 
found in favor of the plaintiffs 
Burton "vs. Salt Lake City, 253 P. 443 
Griffin vs. Salt Lake City, 176 P.(2) 156 
the existence of other facts lead the Court to the 
conclusion that the municipality in those cases was 
engaged in proprietary functions. The appellant con-
tends that the facts in the present case are readily 
distinguishable from all of the other Utah cases and 
within the scope of the Griffin case, supra. 
CONCLUSION 
We respectfully submit that the Court erred in 
dismissing appellant's amended complaint with preju-
dice, and that the cause should be remanded to the 
lower court for trial under appropriate instructions. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WALLACE, ADAMS & PETERSON 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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